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SECURITIES LAW
IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION RECOGNIZED UNDER THE
INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT
Abrahamson v. Fleschner
Statutory enactments in many instances do not contain express
provisions authorizing or prohibiting private damage actions as a
means of enforcement. Courts have often recognized implied private
rights of action, however, in order effectively to implement the spirit
and policy of particular legislation.1 The Investment Advisers Act
of 1940,2 one phase in a series of securities legislation,3 was enacted
"to protect the public from the frauds and misrepresentations of
I The Supreme Court first recognized an implied private right of action in Texas & Pac.
Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916). The case involved a claim brought under the Federal Safety
Appliance Acts, Act of March 2, 1893, Pub. L. No. 196, 27 Stat. 531, as amended by Act of
March 2, 1903, Pub. L. No. 976, 32 Stat. 943, and Act of April 14, 1910, Pub. L. No. 160, 368
Stat. 298. The plaintiff in Rigsby sought damages for personal injuries incurred in a fall
caused by a defect in the ladder of one of defendant's railroad cars. The Safety Appliance
Acts required that each car be equipped with secure ladders and handgrips. Despite the
absence of any express provision in the Act for a private right of action, the Rigsby Court
found that since "[a] disregard of ... the statute [was] a wrongful act, and . I.
result[ed] in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,
the right to recover the damages . . .[was] implied." 241 U.S. at 39. The implied-right-of-
action doctrine has been invoked in numerous situations in order to afford injured parties just
and adequate compensation and to effectuate legislative intent. See Superintendent of Ins.
v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964);
Note, Federal Jurisdiction in Suits for Damages Under Statutes not Affording Such Remedy,
48 COLuM. L. REv. 1090 (1948), wherein it is stated that "[tihe most satisfactory rationale
of such assumption of jurisdiction. . . is found in the general proposition that federal courts
have the power to afford all remedies necessary to the vindication of federal substantive rights
defined in statutory and constitutional provisions, except where Congress has explicitly indi-
cated that such remedy is not available." Id. at 1094. See also 2A J. SUTHERtAND, STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 54.05, at 359 (4th ed. C. Sands 1973).
In considering whether a private action should be recognized under a particular enact-
ment, the courts must often look beyond the statutory language to determine the underlying
policy of the legislation. See id. § 48.04, at 197:
[T]he history of events transpiring during the process of enacting [a statute] ...
has generally been the first extrinsic aid to which courts have turned in attempting
to construe an ambiguous act. . . .Contemporary history also includes informa-
tion concerning the activities of pressure groups, economic conditions in the country
during times when the legislation in question was under consideration, prevailing
business practices, and the prior state of the law ....
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also E. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCrION OF STATUTES § 172, at 273
(1940).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
3 See Dean, Twenty-five Years of Federal Securities Regulation by the Securities and
Exchange Commission, 59 COLUi. L. REv. 697 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Dean], in which
the author examined the inception and development of the various federal securities acts.
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unscrupulous tipsters and touts .. .by making fraudulent prac-
tices by investment advisers unlawful." 4 The language of the 1940
enactment contained ambiguities concerning not only the type of
conduct proscribed, but also the available mechanisms for enforce-
ment.5 Subsequent amendments filled certain of the Act's inters-
tices.' While injunctive relief is now available in actions brought by
the SEC,' and a fine or a term of imprisonment may be imposed for
an adviser's willful violation of the Act,8 a client whose adviser has
violated the Act is afforded no express statutory right of action for
damages directly imputable to the adviser's wrongful conduct. Re-
cently, however, in Abrahamson v. Fleschner, the Second Circuit
held that an implied private right of action for damages exists under
the Investment Advisers Act.'0
The Abrahamson plaintiffs were limited partners in an invest-
ment partnership," Fleschner Becker Associates (FBA), and the
I H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 28 (1940). It was recognized by Congress that
the ease of entry and difficulty of evaluation of practitioners in the field of investment
advising, together with the relative naivete of the clientele, created a need for regulation in
this sector of the securities industry which was particularly compelling. See Note, The Regu-
lation of Investment Advisers, 14 STAN. L. REv. 827, 831 (1962). Although "[i]t might be
argued that anyone who plays the market deserves to be burned,. . . the modern legal trend
• ..runs counter to such an approach. The current question is not whether the investor
should be protected, but to what extent." Id.
' See Dean, supra note 3, at 706. By 1959, "[tlhere [had] been no change in the
Investment Advisers Act since its original promulgation; and since the SEC [had] very
limited powers under it, it [was] relatively unimportant in the over-all picture." Id.
6 Pub. L. No. 86-750, 74 Stat. 885 (1960); Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413, 1430 (1970).
The Act was substantially amended in 1960 and 1970, giving the law wider coverage and
extending the role of the SEC. See Note, Private Causes of Action Under Section 206 of the
Investment Advisers Act, 74 MICH. L. REv. 308, 310-11 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Private
Causes of Action]; Note, The Regulation of Investment Advisers, 14 STAN. L. REv. 827, 838
(1962).
1 Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 209, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9 (1970) provides in pertinent
part:
(e) Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person has engaged...
in any act . . . constituting a violation of any provision of this subchapter, or of
any rule, regulation, or order hereunder, or that any person has aided [or] abetted
• ..such a violation, it may in its discretion bring an action in the proper district
court .. .to enjoin such acts or practices and to enforce compliance with this
subchapter ....
' Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 217, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-17 (Supp. V 1975) provides
that "[any person who willfully violates any provision of this subchapter, or any rule,
regulation, or order promulgated by the Commission under the authority thereof, shall, upon
conviction, be fined not more than $10,000, imprisoned for not more than five years, or both."
9 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977), aff'g in part and rev'g in part 392 F. Supp. 740 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
" 568 F.2d at 876.
II Limited partnerships formed for the purpose of trading in securities with a view toward
capital appreciation are usually called "hedge funds." The term hedge funds is derived from
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defendants were the partnership itself, the accounting firm which
audited FBA, and the individual general partners of FBA.12 Prior to
the formation of the partnership, the plaintiffs had expressed a
concern for financial security and conservatism in their invest-
ments. At that time, and repeatedly thereafter, the general partners
represented that FBA would maintain a "low risk stance" and a
"most conservative posture" in its investments. 3 The partnership's
portfolio, however, contained a large percentage of high-risk unre-
gistered securities. 4 After disclosure of the extent of FBA's invest-
ment in unregistered securities,'5 the plaintiffs sought to withdraw
from the partnership. According to the termination provisions of the
partnership agreement, they could withdraw only at the end of a
fiscal year and upon proper notice. Since the plaintiffs learned of
the unregistered securities soon after the beginning of a new fiscal
year, approximately 8 months elapsed before the withdrawal could
be effected.'" During this period, the plaintiffs maintained, their
FBA accounts sustained significant losses.17 Alleging that the defen-
dants fraudulently and willfully concealed FBA's investment in
high-risk securities by not revealing these investments in reports
furnished all limited partners, the plaintiffs commenced an action
the use of short sales and options as hedging devices againt the partnership's heavily lever-
aged long-term investments. See Berkowitz, Regulation of Hedge Funds, 2 REV. SEc. REG.
961 (1969), reprinted in 1969 SEc. L. REv. 668.
22 568 F.2d at 865-66. The original partnership was comprised of one general and eight
limited partners. The account of each partner was computed on the basis of the appreciated
value of his contributions to the pooled funds, from which withdrawals and certain fees were
deducted. Within 3 years of its formation, the partnership had expanded to three general
partners and 66 limited partners, and possessed assets amounting to approximately $60
million. Id. at 866.
11 Id. In addition to receiving year-end balance sheets and financial reports, all limited
partners also received monthly statements which reiterated the firm's conservative invest-
ment policy and indicated the increase or decrease in the value of FBA's investments.
" Id. at 867. The reports furnished the partners for fiscal years 1966, 1967, and 1968,
prepared by the defendant accounting firm Goodkin, failed to give any indication to the
plaintiffs that FBA had substantial investment in unregistered securities. Id. at 866-67.
"1 In either December 1969 or January 1970, plaintiffs received the partnership financial
report covering the fiscal year ending September 1969. This report was prepared by a different
accounting firm from that which had prepared the reports for previous fiscal years. Plaintiffs
were first apprised of the extent of unregistered securities in FBA's portfolio in a footnote
contained in this year-end report. Id. at 867.
"1 Id. Upon giving the required advance notice, any limited partner could make with-
drawals from his capital account at the end of any fiscal year. After October 1, 1968, 60 days
advance notice was necessary. Id. at 866. Since the financial report which disclosed the
existence of the unregistered securities covered the fiscal year ending September 30, 1969,
plaintiffs did not receive it until December 1969 or January 1970. Therefore, it was too late
for them to withdraw at the end of the 1969 fiscal year. Id. at 867.
'1 Id. The plaintiffs claimed that between September 30, 1968 and the date of their
withdrawal from the partnership, they incurred losses of $1,254,800. Id.
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under the antifraud provisions of the Investment Advisers Act of
1940.11 The district court dismissed the complaint without deter-
mining whether a private damage action may be maintained under
the Advisers Act. 19
l Id. at 865. Investment Advisers Act § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1970) provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser by use of the mails or any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospec-
tive client;
(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client;
(4) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative.
Rule 206(4)-i, 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-i (1977), promulgated thereunder, prescribes that
(a) It shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act, practice
or course of business within the meaning of section 206(4) of the Act, for any
investment adviser, directly or indirectly, to publish, circulate or distribute any
advertisement:
(5) Which contains any untrue statement of a material fact, or which is otherwise
false or misleading.
(b) For the purpose of this section the term "advertisement" shall include
any notice,. circular, letter or other written communication addressed to more than
one person . . . which offers (1) any analysis, report, or publication concerning
securities, or which is to be used in making any determination as to when to buy
or sell any security, or which security to buy or sell ....
The plaintiffs also sought to recover damages under section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), and rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
Section 10(b) provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance ....
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
The district court had dismissed the Exchange Act claim on the ground that there was
"no support for [the] claim that [plaintiffs were] entitled to damages . . . where no loss
ha[d] been suffered and where a substantial gain ha[d] in fact been made." 392 F. Supp.
at 746-47. The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Exchange Act claim. The affirm-
ance, however, was not based on plaintiffs' realization of a net profit from their investments;
rather it rested upon the ground that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted, since the alleged fraud had not occurred "in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security." 568 F.2d at 868; see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723 (1975). The Supreme Court in Blue Chip reaffirmed the doctrine set forth in Birn-
baum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952), that
a complaint under § 10(b) must allege fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security," and held that an allegation that plaintiffs were fraudulently induced not to sell
their securities does not satisfy that requirement. 421 U.S. at 730-31.
11 392 F. Supp. at 750. The thrust of the district court's opinion was that since plaintiffs
had realized a net profit in their overall limited partnership investment, they had suffered
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A divided Second Circuit reversed the district court, holding
that there exists an implied right of action for damages under the
statute.'" Judge Timbers, writing for the majority, 21 applied the
four-pronged test utilized by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash22 to
decide "whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not ex-
pressly providing one ... ."2 The Cort test requires an examina-
tion of whether a private right of action would be consistent with
the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme; whether the
plaintiff is "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was created; ' 24 whether there is any indication of legislative intent
no damages. Id. at 746-47. In addition, the lower court found that plaintiffs would not be
entitled to recover the difference between the amount they had actually received and the
amount they would have received upon withdrawing earlier, since recoverable damages under
the statute are limited to "out of pocket" loss. Id. at 747, 749-50. See note 18 supra.
21 568 F.2d at 879. As a threshold issue, the Abrahamson court was faced with the
question whether the defendants were "investment advisers" as that term is defined in the
Advisers Act. Id. at 869-70. Section 202(11) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) defines
investment adviser as:
any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others, either
directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to
the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for com-
pensation and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or
reports concerning securities ....
This subsection excludes from the definition, among others, banks, lawyers, accountants,
engineers, teachers, brokers (insofar as advising is incidental to brokerage), and publishers
of bona fide newspapers, news magazines, and financial publications. See H.R. REP. No. 2639,
76th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, 28 (1940).
The Second Circuit noted that extensive governmental investigation into the problems
and abuses of investment advisory services had culminated in the finding that the elimination
of such abuses and problems, which were caused by individuals and companies handling pools
of liquid funds or advising the public as to security transactions, could not be achieved
without federal legislation. 568 F.2d at 871 (citing S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 21
(1940)). Guided by these policy considerations, the Abrahamson court held that the defen-
dants fulfilled all criteria set forth in the definition section of the Act so as properly to be
classified as investment advisers. 568 F.2d at 870-71. In reaching this determination, the court
addressed itself to the question whether defendants were "engage[d] in the business of
advising others" with respect to investments within the meaning of the Act. Id. at 870. Given
the substantial compensation defendants received for managing the limited partners' invest-
ments and the heavy reliance the limited partners placed upon defendants' monthly financial
reports in determining whether or not to withdraw any or all of their funds, the Second Circuit
concluded that defendants' activities clearly were within the ambit of the statute. Id.
21 Judge Timbers authored the majority opinion in which Judge Mansfield concurred.
In a separate opinion, Judge Gurfein concurred in the dismissal of the claim based upon
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and dissented from the majority's recognition of an
implied private right of action under the Advisers Act.
- 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
" Id. at 78.
24 Id. (citation omitted). The plaintiff stockholder in Cort sought damages and injunctive
relief against the corporate directors after the latter had authorized the use of corporate funds
for advertising purposes during the 1972 presidential elections. The action was brought under
§ 610 of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970), which prohibits corpo-
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either to create or to deny the right of action; and whether the action
is one traditionally relegated to state law. In concluding that recog-
nition of an implied private right of action would be proper in the
instant case, the Second Circuit relied heavily upon the apparent
purposes of the Advisers Act.25 The court found those purposes to
be the "'protect[ion] [of] the public and investors against mal-
practice by persons paid for advising others about securities' "26 as
well as "effective federal regulation of an important segment of the
securities industry. ' 27 According to the Abrahamson majority, these
purposes would be effectively frustrated by a failure to recognize an
implied private right of action, since the resources of the SEC are
not sufficient to enforce all securities legislation. 28 Noting that the
Act was designed especially for the benefit of persons relying upon
investment advisers for guidance, 29 Judge Timbers concluded that
a private right of action would serve as both an effective supplement
to SEC enforcement of the statute and a deterrent to its violation."0
Turning to the express language of the statute in order to dis-
cern any indication of legislative intent with respect to private ac-
tions, the Second Circuit examined the jurisdictional provisions of
the Act, which accord the district courts jurisdiction over" 'all suits
in equity to enjoin any violation of [the Act].' ""' Judge Timbers
rejected the notion that since the Act, unlike other securities legisla-
tion, does not contain a provision expressly authorizing the exercise
of jurisdiction over actions at law,32 a legislative intention to pre-
rations from making contributions or expenditures for certain federal elections. According to
the Court, "the legislation was primarily concerned with corporations as a source of aggre-
gated wealth and . . . .possibl[y] corrupting influence," 422 U.S. at 82, and was intended
to reduce corporate influence over federal elections. Id. at 85. Any legislative intent to protect
stockholders was, at most, subsidiary to Congress' principal goal. Id. Primarily because
implication of a private right of action was not consistent with the underlying policy of the
legislation, and due to evidence that it was not within the contemplation of the legislature
that a private right of action should exist, the Court refused to imply such an action. Id. at
77-82.
568 F.2d at 873-76.
26 Id. at 873 (quoting S. REP. No. 1760, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1960)).
568 F.2d at 874.
2Id.
Id. at 873 (citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186-91
(1963)).
" 568 F.2d at 874-76.
3, Id. at 874 (quoting Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 214, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (1970
& Supp. V 1975)).
32 The jurisdictional provision of the Advisers Act, § 214, provides: "The district courts
of the United States . . .shall have jurisdiction of violations of this subchapter or the rules,
regulations, or orders thereunder, and concurrently with State and Territorial courts, of all
suits in equity to enjoin any violation of this subchapter or the rules, regulations or orders
thereunder." 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Section 22 of the Securities Act of
[Vol. 52:343
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clude private rights of action is thereby manifested. 33 The court
minimized the significance of this apparent dichotomy, reasoning
that, while other securities laws contain "one or more sections
expressly granting injured parties a private right of action for dam-
ages," no such provision exists under the Advisers Act and any
reference to actions at law in the jurisdictional section of the latter
would therefore be superfluous. 4 Although the Act thus does not
expressly confer jurisdiction over actions at law, the A brahamson
court observed, neither does it expressly deny such jurisdiction. It
was therefore determined that the precise issue of a private right of
action under the Act was never considered by Congress. 5 The ab-
sence of clear legislative intent to preclude a private right of action,
coupled with the finding that such an action would strongly promote
the remedial purposes of the Act, led the Second Circuit to conclude
that a private damage action may be maintained under the anti-
fraud provisions of the Advisers Act."
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1970), § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1970), and § 44 of the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1970), all state that
the district courts shall have jurisdiction of "all suits in equity and actions at law brought to
enforce any liability or duty created by" those Acts.
31 568 F.2d at 874-75.
' Id.
= Id. at 875.
Id. at 875-76. Having determined that there exists a private right of action under the
Advisers Act, the Abrahamson court was faced with the question whether the plaintiffs'
complaint alleged compensable damages under that Act. Id. at 877. Unlike the district court,
see note 18 supra, the Second Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs had alleged compensable
damages even though they had not incurred a net loss in their overall investments. According
to the court, the damages of a client whose adviser has mismanaged his funds are not rendered
overly speculative by the fact that the client failed to claim he would have "taken some
remedial action if he had known the truth." 568 F.2d at 877-78. Issuing instructions to guide
the district court upon remand, the Second Circuit stated that the damages awarded should
equal "that part of net losses incurred on unregistered securities after the point when defen-
dants' representations became fraudulent which stems from the portion of those investments
inconsistent with defendants' representations." Id. at 879. In other words, plaintiffs would
be entitled to recover their proportionate share of the partnershili's losses on unregistered
securities computed from the time defendants made misrepresentations to plaintiffs concern-
ing the nature of the partnership's investments. See id. at 878-79.
It should be noted that the Advisers Act contains no provision whatsoever which places
a limitation on the type or extent of recoverable damages. This omission can be traced to
the absence of any provision in the statute which authorizes actions for damages. In contrast,
other securities laws expressly provide for private actions and contain specific damage provi-
sions. For instance, the Public Utility Holding Co. Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79p (1970), the
Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77www (1970), and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1970 & Supp. V 1975), state that "no person permitted to maintain
a suit for damages under the provisions of [these Acts] shall recover . . .a total amount in
excess of his actual damages on account of the act complained of."
Many courts have encountered difficulty in accurately calculating the amount of dam-
ages in securities actions. Various formulae have been enunciated, some of which limited
1978]
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Judge Gurfein, in a separate opinion, objected to the implica-
tion of a private damage action. In reaching this conclusion, the
dissent relied chiefly on the jurisdictional provisions of the
Act- specifically, the absence of a grant of jurisdiction over
"actions at law. ' 38 According to Judge Gurfein, the key issue was
not whether there should be an implied private right of action, but
rather whether there should be an implied private right of action for
damages. The judge was of the opinion that the absence of a grant
of jurisdiction over actions at law "indicates that Congress was not
intending to provide for any liability beyond injunctive relief."39 He
went on to note that a strict construction of the statutory language
was especially warranted in view of the legislative history of the Act
which reveals it to be merely "a tentative attempt to effect a
'compulsory census' . . . rather than to provide a full regulatory
scheme."'" Distinguishing the Investment Advisers Act from other
plaintiffs' recovery to actual or "out of pocket" losses. See Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.,
478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973); Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1971); Estate
Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527 (10th
Cir. 1962) (damages are not what plaintiff might have gained, but what he has lost as a result
of his fraudulently induced purchase of securities). But see Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S, 128 (1972) (plaintiff is entitled to windfall when defendant is forced to
disgorge profits made through the fraudulent transaction); Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp.,
476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1973) (remedy is to give plaintiff a windfall by forcing defendant to
disgorge profits); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965)
(more appropriate to give defrauded party benefit of windfall than to allow fraudulent party
to benefit from his misconduct). See also 3 A. BROMBERG, SECURTIES LAW: FRAUD § 9.1, at
225 (1973); Note, The Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded
Securities, 26 STAN. L. REv. 371, 379 (1974).
In order to assess accurately the damages directly resulting from the fraudulent misrepre-
sentations, it will be necessary for the Abrahamson district court on remand to isolate the
losses incurred by the partnership on its investments which were due to natural market forces.
This may prove to be a difficult and highly technical endeavor. For an in depth analysis of
the various methods of computing damages in actions brought under the securities laws, see
Mullaney, Theories of Measuring Damages in Security Cases and the Effects of Damages on
Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. Rv. 277 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Mullaney]. The author exam-
ined several traditional approaches to the calculation of damages, including "out of pocket,"
out of pocket plus recovery of subsequent profit, rescission, and a cover remedy. As to the
difficulty in separating those losses attributable to a defendant's conduct from those occa-
sioned by market forces, the author noted that "some courts, with the help of expert wit-
nesses, have undertaken a detailed, technical analysis of securities prices." Id. at 278-79. See,
e.g., Bonime v. Doyle, 416 F. Supp. 1372 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), wherein, in addition to separating
losses due to market forces, the court also "separate[d] the losses suffered by short-term
speculators from those losses suffered by longer-term investors who, presumably, relied on
defendants' statements." Mullaney, supra, at 288 (citing 416 F. Supp. at 1377).
' 568 F.2d at 879 (Gurfein, J., dissenting).
Id. at 880-81 (Gurfein, J., dissenting).
3, Id. at 880 (footnotes omitted) (Gurfein, J., dissenting).
Id. at 879 (Gurfein, J., dissenting) (citing Hearings on S. 3580 Before the Subcomm.
of the Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 48 (1940)(remarks of
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securities legislation,41 the dissent found that the Act represents a
compromise between the SEC and the investment advisory indus-
try, the basis of which was "congressional reluctance to 'over-
regulate' the advisory industry . . and a desire to minimize the
potential liability of [investment] advisers. 4 2 While Judge Gurfein
acknowledged that one purpose of the Act is to protect investors, he
indicated that the danger of vexatious suits requires that this pur-
pose not be implemented without limitation. 3 Pointing out that
subsequent amendments to the Act have failed to alter its jurisdic-
tional provisions or otherwise expand the liability of advisers,44
Judge Gurfein could find no evidence of a legislative preference for
a private damage action and no basis for judicial creation of such
an action.45
The Second Circuit decision in Abrahamson marks the first
time a federal appellate court has addressed the question whether
David Schenker representing the SEC)). Judge Gurfein read the legislative history of the Act
as indicative of a congressional intent to require only registration of investment advisers. 568
F.2d at 879.
" Id. at 880 (Gurfein, J., dissenting).
,' Private Causes of Action, supra note 6, at 319-20 & n.69.
a 568 F.2d at 882 (Gurfein, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed in particular to the
danger that "[i]mplying a claim for relief without limitation will encourage actions against
investment advisers for poor judgment, disguised by pleadings subtly implying fraud and
deceit. . . .The blackmail effect of allowing customers to sue investment advisers for dam-
ages for what the customer might have done if he had but known, seems obvious .... Id.
at 886 (Gurfein, J., dissenting).
" Judge Gurfein emphasized that when Congress amended the Investment Advisers Act
in 1970, it addressed the issue of civil liability of investment advisers, but failed to include
any provision for liability to individual clients. Id. at 883 (Gurfein, J., dissenting). The dis-
sent also pointed out that in 1960 Congress granted the SEC authority to seek injunctive
relief, but neither created any express liability for damages nor provided for actions at law.
Id. at 883 & n.13. (Gurfein, J., dissenting). Lastly, Judge Gurfein argued, Congress had a
recent opportunity to authorize a private right of action when an amendment containing such
a provision was proposed by the SEC, but failed to do so. Id. at 884 (Gurfein, J., dissenting).
The majority in Abrahamson interpreted congressional silence on the propriety of a
private right of action as evidence that Congress never considered creating a private right of
action. Id. at 875. Congressional inaction, either at the time of the initial enactment or after
the proposed SEC amendment, it is submitted, should not be the basis of a finding that the
legislature deliberately intended to preclude a private right of action. The Abrahamson situa-
tion may be distinguished from that in National R,R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of
R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974), a case relied upon by the dissent, wherein the original
draft of the statute in question contained a provision for a private damage action, but as
redrafted and finally enacted the statute "did not authorize suits by 'any person adversely
affected or aggrieved.'" Id. at 460. While evidence of congressional intent to deny a private
right of action thus may be gleaned from the deletion of a particular provision authorizing
such an action, mere failure to enact a provision authorizing the action does not seem to
support a similar conclusion. See note 61 infra.
" 568 F.2d at 883-84 & n.13 (Gurfein, J., dissenting).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:343
an implied right of action exists under the antifraud provisions of
the Advisers Act. Although the courts which have dealt with the
issue have not arrived at uniform conclusions," it is submitted that
the majority holding in Abrahamson accurately implements rele-
vant Supreme Court authority and is supported by sound policy
considerations. The test enunciated in Cort v. Ash47 seems to be the
appropriate point of departure in determining whether a cause of
action for damages should be implied.48 Two important considera-
tions under that standard are the intent of Congress with respect to
a private action and the consistency of such an action with the
underlying statutory scheme.4" In weighing these factors, several
courts have refused to imply a damage suit under the Act, relying
upon the failure of the statute to grant jurisdiction over actions at
law.5 1 Other courts, however, like the Abrahamson panel, have dis-
46 See, e.g., Sullivan v. Chase Inv. Servs. of Boston, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal.
1977) (private right of action for damages exists under the Advisers Act); accord, Jones v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 409 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Angelakis v. Churchill Management Corp., [1975-1976] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,285
(N.D. Cal. 1975); Bolger v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 381 F. Supp. 260
(S.D.N.Y. 1974). Contra, Greenspan v. Del Toro, [1975-1976] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,488 (S.D. Fla. 1974); Gammage v. Roberts, Scott & Co., [1974-1975] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 94,761 (S.D. Cal. 1974). See notes 50-51 and accompanying text infra.
4' 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
See 422 U.S. at 78. The applicability of the Cort test recently was reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court's decision in Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977). Chris-Craft
involved an action for damages brought under section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970 & Supp. V 1975), which prohibits fraud in connection with
tender offers, and rule 10b-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1977), which prohibits an issuer from
market tampering by purchasing his own stock while it is in the process of distribution. The
gravamen of plaintiff Chris-Craft's complaint was that it had been prevented from gaining
control of the target corporation Piper by virtue of defendants' § 14(e) and rule 10b-6 viola-
tions. The Court held that Chris-Craft possessed no implied private right of action under
§ 14(e), since the sole purpose of that provision was to protect the shareholder-investor who
is faced with the decision of accepting or rejecting a tender offer. 430 U.S. at 35, 42. The
10b-6 claim also was disallowed as there had been no allegation that the price plaintiffs
paid for the Piper stock was influenced by the defendants' misrepresentations. Id. at 45.
The Chris-Craft Court applied the Cart test in determining whether plaintiffs should be
granted a private right of action. Id. at 37-41. Interestingly, while the majority warned that
the Court "must be wary against interpolating its notions of policy in the interstices of
legislative provisions," id. at 26 (citing Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 11 (1942)),
the Court's refusal to recognize an implied private right of action nevertheless depended to a
great extent on its view of the applicable legislative intent. See 430 U.S. at 37-41. The Chris-
Craft Court also found it consistent with the underlying legislative scheme to relegate the
plaintiffs" 'to whatever remedy is created by state law.'" Id. at 41 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 84 (1975)).
' 422 U.S. at 78.
See, e.g., Greenspan v. Del Toro, [1975-19761 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 95,488 (S.D.
Fla. 1974). The Greenspan court espoused a jurisdictional rationale for its holding similar to
that of the Abrahamson dissent. Reasoning that § 14 of the Advisers Act failed to grant
district courts jurisdiction over "actions at law," the court concluded that, at most, a private
SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1976 TERM
counted this omission and permitted the action to be maintained.5 1
As witnessed by this division of authority, the absence of an express
jurisdictional grant concerning legal actions is at best an ambiguous
indication of congressional intent .5 There exists much in the legisla-
right of action could extend only to actions in equity for injunctive relief. Id. at 99,459-60. In
Gammage v. Roberts, Scott & Co., [1974-1975] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,761 (S.D. Cal.
1974), an action alleging violations of margin account restrictions, the court also held that
no private right of action exists under the Advisers Act. The Gammage court, however,
indicated that even "[a]ssuming a private right of action exist[ed], any violation of the
Investment Advisers Act must be wilful." Id.
"' See, e.g., Sullivan v. Chase Inv. Servs. of Boston, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal.
1977). Applying the Cort test, the Sullivan court held that an implied right of action exists
under the Advisers Act. Interestingly, the Sullivan court posited that in the aftermath of the
Supreme Court's decision in Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977), discussed in
note 48 supra, "a new and more stringent standard of conformance to legislative purpose" is
required, 434 F. Supp. at 182 n.17. This element of the Cort test may now be read to mandate
a determination that a private right of action "'is necessary to effectuate Congress' goals,'"
id. (emphasis in original), rather than merely consistent with the underlying legislative
scheme. Applying either standard, the court found implication of a private right of action
for damages to be warranted. Id. Furthermore, the court noted that "the existence of private
actions will significantly increase the statute's effectiveness" and may provide "the only way
injured investors can recover money they have lost to dishonest investment advisers." Id. at
183.
In Bolger v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 381 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), limited partners were held to have a right of action under the Advisers Act. In light of
the clear legislative intent to protect persons who pay for investment advice, the court found
that the "plaintiffs . . . fle]ll squarely within the class of persons whom the antifraud
provisions . . . were designed to protect." Id. at 263. The Bolger court rejected the argument
that the omission of "actions at law" from the jurisdictional grant of the statute precluded
implication of a right of action for damages on the ground that it was unnecessary to include
reference to "actions at law" given the absence of any express provision in the Act authorizing
a civil action by a private person. Id. at 264; accord, Jones v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y
of the United States, 409 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Angelakis v. Churchill Management
Corp., [1975-1976] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) % 95,285 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
In a very recent case, the Fifth Circuit has adopted the reasoning of the Abrahamson
court and held that a private right of action may be implied under the Investment Advisers
Act. Wilson v. First Houston Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1978). The plaintiff in Wilson
had given the defendant adviser a power of attorney to manage his stock portfolio. Defendant
converted all of plaintiff's securities (valued at the time the power of attorney was given at
over $100,000) into other securities chosen by him. In approximately 11/2 years, the value of
plaintiff's account had diminished to a little over $5,000. Id. at 1237. Defendant had adver-
tised the use of computer analysis of the market to eliminate investment in substandard
securities, but never advised plaintiff that utilization of the computer method had ceased.
Id. Utilizing the Cort test and discussing both the majority and dissenting opinions in
Abrahamson, see id. at 1239-43, the Wilson court found Judge Gurfein's jurisdictional argu-
ment as to legislative intent to preclude a private right of action as well as his similar
interpretation of the omission of any damage provision in the Act, "no more persuasive than
the reading given this matter by the [Abrahamson] majority .. . [and found] no substan-
tial assistance from the legislative history with respect to Congress' intentions." Id. at 1242.
52 The ambiguity surrounding the jurisdictional omission is enhanced by language in
both the House and Senate reports describing the enforcement provisions of the Advisers Act
as "generally comparable" to those of the Investment Company Act under which courts have
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tive history, on the other hand, to support the position that a dam-
age action premised upon the Act's antifraud provisions should be
recognized. 3
Notwithstanding the dissent's view of the statute as merely
envisioning a compulsory census of investment advisers, "[a] care-
ful reading [of it] . . . shows that . . . the Act is an integral part
of a comprehensive regulatory scheme intended by Congress to elim-
inate certain abuses in the securities industry."5 Both the Advisers
Act and the Investment Company Act55 are the outgrowth of an
investigation of investment trusts and investment advisers under-
taken by the SEC. 6 The investigation revealed not only that organi-
zational and operational abuses were prevalent, but also that losses
by investors often were attributable to selfish and unscrupulous
mismanagment.57 Perhaps prompted by these findings, Congress
recognized that the "perpetrations of . . . misfeasances and the
recurrence of . . . abuses [could not] be completely abated nor
. . . deficiencies eliminated without the enactment of adequate
Federal [regulatory] legislation . . .,,8
By creating a vehicle for clients who have suffered damages as
implied a private right of action and whose jurisdictional provision contains the "actions at
law" language. See H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 30 (1940); S. REP. No. 1775,
76th Cong., 3d Sess. 23 (1940).
It should be noted that the absence of a jurisdictional provision does not deprive the
federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction over implied causes of action under the Advisers
Act. Such jurisdiction may be predicated upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), which
confers jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law.
- See S. REP. No. 1760, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1960] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3502; H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1940); S. REP. No. 1775, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1940); H.R. Doc. No. 477, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1939).
-' 568 F.2d at 876 n.23. The need for securities legislation resulted to a large degree from
underlying social and economic elements, such as the use of the great national
corporation, the separation of ownership among an increasing segment of the popu-
lation, and the intangible and liquid character of that vast share of the national
wealth represented by corporate securities ....
Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 28
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 214, 214-15 (1959). As another commentator has noted, the Investment
Advisers Act represents an attempt by Congress to establish some measure of control over a
previously unregulated business, a business which was assuming a growing and important role
in the securities industry. The enactment of the Act primarily was intended "to protect
investors from those whose superior knowledge of the securities industry enabled them to
capitalize on the credulity of the less financially sophisticated members of the public." 19
U. MIAMI L. REV. 148, 149 (1964) (footnotes omitted). See also 38 TUL. L. REv. 778, 779
(1964).
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
, See Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of
1940, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 214, 244 (1959).
17 H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 4, 7 (1940) (emphasis added).
m S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 11 (1940).
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a result of the fraudulent conduct of investment advisers to seek
direct compensation for their losses, implication of a private right
of action for damages seems consistent with and in furtherance of
the purposes of the Act." Since a defrauded client denied a private
right of action might receive no compensation for his losses, espe-
cially in instances similar to the instant case where the purchase or
sale prerequisite to suit under section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act"0 is not satisfied, the Advisers Act's remedial objectives
could be eviscerated if such an action were not implied." The reme-
dies expressly provided by the statute appear insufficient to afford
full relief to injured clients, as neither a criminal prosecution nor
injunctive relief will assist the defrauded client in recouping his
losses. Since the main impetus to passage of the Act was concern
for the interests of the investor,6 2 an implied private right of action
11 See Wilson v. First Houston Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1978); Sullivan v.
Chase Inv. Servs. of Boston, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Jones v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 409 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Angelakis v. Church-
ill Management Corp., [1975-1976] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,285 (N.D. Cal. 1975);
Bolger v. Laventhol, Krekstein; Horwath & Horwath, 381 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
tO See § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), discussed
in note 18 supra.
61 See Sullivan v. Chase Inv. Servs. of Boston, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 171, 183 (N.D. Cal.
1977). The nature of the underlying legislative scheme and the importance of an implied
private right of action in effectuating the purposes of the Advisers Act clearly distinguish the
Abrahamson case from National R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak) v. National Ass'n of R.R.
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974). The plaintiffs in Amtrak sought an injunction under the Rail
Passenger Service Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C. §§ 501-645 (1970 & Supp. V. 1975), to prevent the
discontinuance of certain rail service. There was convincing evidence that Congress intention-
ally failed to include a provision for a private right of action since the purpose of the Act was
not the protection of plaintiffs' class, but rather the most effective and economically feasible
operation of the railroad. Although Judge Gurfein in his dissenting opinion in Abrahamson
relied on the language in Amtrak, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) (quoting Botany Mills v. United
States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929)), that "'when a statute limits a thing to be done in a
particular mode, it includes the negative of any other mode,'" 568 F.2d at 882 (Gurfein, J.,
dissenting), it would nevertheless appear that the underlying purposes of the Advisers Act
would be sufficient to satisfy the requirement of "clear contrary evidence of legislative intent"
necessary to refute that rule of statutory construction. 414 U.S. at 458; see Note, Private
Rights of Action Under Amtrak and Ash: Some Implications for Implication, 123 U. PA. L.
REv. 1392 (1975).
u See S. REP. No. 1760, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1960] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 3502; H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1940); S. REP. No. 1775, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1940); H.R. Doc. No. 477, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1939).
The Advisers Act received extensive discussion by the Supreme Court in SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963). Although the issue whether a private right
of action for damages should be implied was not directly addressed by the Court, statutory
interpretation of the antifraud provisions of § 206 was involved. The Court stated that
"Congress intended the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to be construed like other securities
legislation 'enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds,' not technically and restrictively, but
flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes." Id. at 195 (emphasis added)(footnote omitted).
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seems to be an essential supplement to its effective implementation.
The two remaining factors to be examined under the Cort test
are whether the cause of action under consideration is one tradition-
ally relegated to the state sphere and whether the statute from
which the action is to be implied was intended especially to benefit
persons in the plaintiff's class.6 3 Although it is possible for a de-
frauded plaintiff to pursue his claim under state law, it is suggested
that the extensive federal and limited state regulation in the securi-
ties area militates against classifying such an action as traditionally
state in nature. 4 With respect to the intended beneficiaries of the
Investment Advisers Act, the legislative history clearly indicates, as
Judge Gurfein acknowledged in his dissenting opinion,65 that Con-
gress was endeavoring "to protect the public and investors against
malpractice by persons paid for advising others about securities.""6
As one commentator has noted, "Congress has seen the need for general and flexible antifraud
provisions in the field of securities regulation in order to control 'the versatile inventions of
fraud-doers.'" 5 B.C. INDUS. & COMM. L. REv. 838, 841 (1964).
422 U.S. at 78.
Securities laws pertaining to investment advisory services have not been enacted on
the state level in a uniform fashion. See Private Causes of Action, supra note 6, at 324. Only
27 states have statutes dealing with regulation of investment advisers and these, for the most
part, are modeled after the federal statutes. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.020 (1962); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 67-1236 (1966); CAL. CORP. CODE § 25235 (West Supp. 1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 36-338(b) (West 1969); HAW. REv. STAT. § 485-25(b) (1976); IDAHO CODE § 30-1404 (1967);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 '/2, § 137.12j (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1-12.1
(Burns Supp. 1977); KAN. STAT. § 17-1253(b) (1974); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.320 (Baldwin
1972); MD. CORP. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 11-302 (1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 451.502 (1968);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80A.02 (West Supp. 1978); Mo. REV. STAT. § 409.102 (1969); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 15-2005(2) (1967); NEB. Rav. STAT. § 8-1102(2) (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-
53 (West 1970); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-18-29B (1966); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.42 (Page
1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 102 (West 1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-404 (Purdon
Supp. 1978); S.C. CODE § 35-1-1220 (1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-2 (1968); VA. CODE § 13.1-
503 (1973); WASH. REv. CODE § 21.20.020 (1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 551.44 (West 1975); Wyo.
STAT. § 17-117.2 (1965).
The existence of an implied right of action under the Advisers Act, it is suggested, will
not prevent an injured party from pursuing whatever remedy may be available under state
law. Section 18 of the Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-18a (1970), provides that "[niothing in
[the Act] shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commissioner . . . of any State over
any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of [the Act]."
The Securities Act of 1933 contains a similar provision preserving state jurisdiction, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77r (1970), which has been interpreted to mean that federal courts and state courts may
exercise concurrent jurisdiction over securities transactions. See, e.g., Traveler's Health Ass'n
v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 877, 51 S.E.2d 263 (1949), affl'd, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); Grenader v.
Lefkowitz, 47 App. Div. 2d 359, 367 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1st Dep't 1975). Similarly, the provisions
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 have not been viewed as precluding the pursuit of a
state cause of action based on conduct that would amount to a violation of that Act. See,
e.g., McCollum v. Billings, 53 Misc. 2d 661, 279 N.Y.S.2d 609 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County
1967).
568 F.2d at 882 (Gurfein, J., dissenting).
Id. at 873 (Gurfein, J., dissenting) (quoting S. REP. No. 1760, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1,
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Such an express statement of legislative intent would seem suffi-
cient to satisfy the Cort criterion. 7
Judge Gurfein nonetheless emphasized that investors were not
the sole intended beneficiaries of the Act." Pointing to the fact that
the Advisers Act represents a compromise between the lawmakers
and the investment advisory industry, the dissent suggested that a
judicially created action for damages would impose increased liabil-
ity upon the industry, contrary to the intent of Congress.69 The
existence of such a compromise, however, would not seem to serve
as an absolute bar to implication of a private right of action. While
some degree of disruption within the industry will probably ensue,
the greater protection afforded investors appears more in accord
with the overriding congressional purpose.70 Furthermore, the indus-
try itself might realize some benefits as a result of the investor's
additional protection. Undoubtedly, the possibility of civil liability
will encourage compliance with the provisions of the statute.7' The
goals of the industry would seem to be furthered by substantial
compliance with the statute, since the public's confidence in the
industry would thereby be enhanced and the individual bona fide
adviser would be shielded from the stigma of the activities of less
trustworthy practitioners.7 1
Moreover, the concern voiced by the dissent-that investment
advisers would be constantly burdened with vexatious and specious
actions commenced for their settlement value73-could be assuaged
by placing limitations on the class of persons entitled to bring a
private action, as well as the type of damages compensable under
the Act. These limitations would be consistent with the recent deci-
sions of the Supreme Court delineating the conduct actionable
reprinted in [1960] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3502).
" See 422 U.S. at 82-84; Private Causes of Action, supra note 6, at 316-20.
568 F.2d at 882 (Gurfein, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 880-81 (Gurfein, J., dissenting).
See notes 49-62 and accompanying text supra.
7, 568 F.2d at 872-73. As one commentator has pointed out, the SEC's investigatory
powers come into effect only after it has reason to believe that the Advisers Act has been or
is about to be violated. Private Causes of Action, supra note 6, at 323 n.93. Therefore, SEC
action is predicated upon the not-so-certain condition that a particular violation will be
brought to the Commission's attention or viewed as warranting SEC investigation. It is
submitted that there exists an increased likelihood that action would be taken by a defrauded
client, most likely in the form of a civil damage suit. This enhanced possibility of action
should result in an implied right of action being a greater deterrent to violation of the Act
than an SEC investigation.
,2 See H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 28 (1940).
n 568 F.2d at 886 (Gurfein, J., dissenting).
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under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.11 The Court has indi-
cated its refusal to permit the extension of cognizable claims under
the securities laws beyond controllable and definitive boundaries. 5
Although these cases were decided under the 1934 Act, the apparent
policy enunciated in them-to ensure that normal business prac-
tices and activities are not disrupted by expansive application of the
federal securities laws- 6 is equally applicable to the Advisers Act.
The A brahamson ruling is not necessarily inconsistent with
such a policy. While it may be true that the Second Circuit decision
has extended, rather than restricted, the class of persons entitled to
bring an action under the securities laws, it is submitted that such
an extension is within the ambit of the underlying goals of securities
legislation and is consistent with the limitations established by the
Supreme Court. Indeed, the Abrahamson decision does not create
an overly broad potential plaintiff class, since the adviser-client
relationship is a clearly definable one in which the client normally
has personal contact with the adviser and acts in reliance upon the
latter's judgment." This client limitation, analogous to the
purchaser-seller limitation under the Securities Exchange Act,"
should be strictly imposed.
In recognizing an implied suit for damages under the Invest-
ment Advisers Act, the Second Circuit in Abrahamson seems to
11 See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). The Hochfelder Court
restricted potential causes of action by holding that scienter is a requisite element of a private
damage action under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). To
satisfy a scienter standard, more than ordinary negligence on the part of the defendant must
be shown. See Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 792-93 (7th Cir. 1977); Sund-
strand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1039-40 (7th Cir. 1977); Hirsch v. DuPont,
553 F.2d 750, 759 (2d Cir. 1977). For a discussion of scienter requirements with respect to
10(b) violations, see 2 A. BROMBERO, SEcumrIES LAW: FRAUD 88 8.4(000), (500)-(690) (1973).
See generally Van Graafeiland, Foreword: A Lawyer's Observations on Hochfelder, 51 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 239 (1977).
" See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Store, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). The Court in
Blue Chip reaffirmed its adherence to the purchaser-seller requirement in actions brought
pursuant to § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. See note 18 supra.
,1 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), wherein the Court
pointed out that the absence of the purchaser-seller restriction would increase the incidence
of vexatious suits which are particularly damaging to the securities business. Indeed, "[the
very pendency of the lawsuit may frustrate or delay normal business activity on the defendant
which is totally unrelated to the lawsuit." Id. at 740; cf. Note, New Light on an Old Debate:
Negligence v. Scienter in an SEC Fraud Injunctive Suit, 51 ST. JOHN's L. Rav. 759 (1977),
wherein the author states that "requiring the SEC to plead and prove scienter ... would
merely serve to prevent the waste and unfairness of an unsuccessful suit." Id. at 783 (footnote
omitted).
" See 568 F.2d at 870-71.
," See § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(1970) and rule
10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977); note 18 supra.
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have rendered a decision in consonance with the principles govern-
ing judicial creation of private rights of action. An analysis of the
considerations relevant to determining the propriety of such an ac-
tion points to the conclusion that the court's holding was fully war-
ranted. In terms of legislative purpose, the specter of civil liability
should contribute to reducing the perpetration of fraudulent prac-
tices by advisers.7 9 Since the protection of the investor against such
practices is the ultimate and overriding goal of the Investment Ad-
visers Act,80 the Second Circuit's recognition of an implied damage
action appears to provide an efficacious mechanism for achieving
the desired objective of the legislation.
Denise M. Dalton
71 See note 71 supra.
" See notes 49-61 and accompanying text supra.

